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Abstract—Penetration testing is a security exercise aimed at assessing the security of a system by simulating attacks against it. So far,
penetration testing has been carried out mainly by trained human attackers and its success critically depended on the available
expertise. Automating this practice constitutes a non-trivial problem, as the range of actions that a human expert may attempts against
a system and the range of knowledge she relies on to take her decisions are hard to capture. In this paper, we focus our attention on
simplified penetration testing problems expressed in the form of capture the flag hacking challenges, and we apply reinforcement
learning algorithms to try to solve them. In modeling these capture the flag competitions as reinforcement learning problems we
highlight the specific challenges that characterize penetration testing. We observe these challenges experimentally across a set of
varied simulations, and we study how different reinforcement learning techniques may help us addressing these challenges. In this way
we show the feasibility of tackling penetration testing using reinforcement learning, and we highlight the challenges that must be taken
into consideration, and possible directions to solve them.
Index Terms—Penetration Testing, Capture the Flag, Reinforcement Learning, Q-Learning, Imitation Learning.
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1 INTRODUCTION
S ECURING modern systems and infrastructures is a cen-tral challenge in computer security. As an increasing
amount of data and services are delivered through electronic
platforms, guaranteeing their correct functioning is crucial
for the working on modern society. Given the complexity
of current systems, assessing their security constitute a hard
problem, both from a theoretical and a practical point of
view.
A traditional approach to evaluating security adopts a
defensive stance, in which systems are analyzed and hard-
ened from the point of view of a defender. An alternative
pro-active perspective is offered by an offensive stance. Pen-
etration testing (PT), or ethical hacking, consists in performing
authorized simulated cyber-attacks against a computer sys-
tem, with the aim of identifying weaknesses and assessing
the overall security. The usefulness of offensive security
as a tool to discover vulnerabilities is undisputed [1]. PT,
though, is a complex and costly activity, requiring relevant
knowledge of the target system and of the potential attacks
that may be carried against it. Thus, in order to produce
relevant insights, PT needs experts able to carefully probe
a system and uncover known and, ideally, still unknown
vulnerabilities.
A way to train human experts and allow them to ac-
quire ethical hacking knowledge is offered by capture the
flag competitions (CTF). In a CTF, participants are given
the opportunity to conduct different types of real-world
attacks against dedicated systems, with the aim of exploiting
vulnerabilities behind which they can collect a flag. A CTF is
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a simplified and well-defined model of PT, usually designed
as an educational exercise.
Software applications have been developed to automate
some aspects of PT, but they mostly reduce to tools that
carry out specific tasks under the direction of a human
user. Traditional approaches from artificial intelligence, such
as planning, were also deployed in the hope of further
automating PT through the generation of attack plans [2];
however, human input is still critical to model the context
and the target system, and to finally derive conclusions
about the actual vulnerabilities.
Recent advances in artificial intelligence and machine
learning may offer a way to overcome some of the current
limitations in automating PT. In particular, the paradigm of
reinforcement learning (RL) [3] was proven to be a versatile
and effective method for solving complex problems involv-
ing agents trying to behave optimally in a given environ-
ment. RL applications embrace a large number of algorithms
and methods with varying degrees of computational and
sample complexity, including methods that require minimal
expert modeling. Games provide an excellent benchmark for
RL, and state-of-the-art methods have achieved remarkable
or super-human performances in solving many complex
games, ranging from the traditional Go [4] to modern Atari
games [5], [6].
These developments suggest the possibility of adopting
RL for tackling the PT problem. As a form of gamification
of PT, CTFs provide an ideal setting for deploying RL algo-
rithms and training agents that, in the long run, may learn to
carry out complete PT independently of human supervision.
This idea is not new, and it was in fact spearheaded some
years ago by DARPA, which hosted in 2016 the Cyber
Grand Challenge Event, a cyber-hacking tournament open
to artificial agents trained using machine learning [7].
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2In this paper, we study the problem of modeling PT as
a set of CTF challenges that can be solved using RL. While
adopting the game paradigm offered by CTF may seem a
perfect fit for RL, we critically analyze the specific chal-
lenges that arise from applying RL to PT. A first challenge
is given by obscurity, or the problem of discovering the
structure underlying a CTF problem. A second challenge
is given by unimodality, or the problem of RL agents of
using a single mode of reasoning (inference) for learning.
We analyze these problems experimentally, and we evaluate
how different RL techniques (lazy loading, state aggregation,
and imitation learning) may help in tackling these challenges.
At the end we show that, while RL may in principle allow
for model-free learning, reliance on some form of prior
knowledge may be in practice required to make the problem
solvable. We argue that RL provides an interesting avenue
of research for PT not because it allows for pure model-
free learning (as in contrast with more traditional model-
based artificial intelligence algorithms), but because it may
offer a more flexible way to trade off the amount of prior
knowledge an agent is provided and the amount of structure
an agent is expected to discover.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
offers a review of the main ideas in PT and RL relevant
to this work, as well as a review of previous related work.
Section 3 discusses the problem of modeling PT and CTF as
a learning problem, and highlights the specific challenges
connected to security. Section 4 gives specific details of our
experimental modeling, Section 5 presents the results of
simulations, and Section 6 discusses the results in light of the
challenges we uncovered. Section 7 suggests future avenues
of research. Finally, Section 8 summarizes our conclusions.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section we provide the basic concepts and ideas in the
fields of PT and RL, and we review previous applications
of artificial intelligence and machine learning to the PT
problem.
2.1 Penetration Testing
Modern computer systems, digital devices and networks
may present several types of vulnerabilities, ranging from
low-level software binary exploitation to exploitation of
network services. These vulnerabilities can be the target of
hackers having multiple types of motivations and ways of
attacking. PT aims at assuming the perspective of such hack-
ers and at performing attacks in order to unveil potential
vulnerabilities.
2.1.1 Hacking attacks
Although there is no strict rule on how to carry out a
hacking attack, it is still possible to identify the steps that
are common in many scenarios. From the perspective of the
attacker, hacking basically consists of steps of information
gathering and steps of exploitation (exploiting the vulnerabil-
ities to perform the attack).
In the first stage of information gathering an attacker
usually collects technical information on the target by prob-
ing the system (e.g.: mapping the website content to find-
ing useful information, identifying the input parameters of
server side scripts). The bottleneck of the attack process is
determining a specific vulnerability. Vulnerabilities may be
very different, and the second step of exploitation requires
understanding the dynamics of the the target system and
tailoring the actions to the identified weakness. An attacker
has generally to rely on a wide spectrum of competences,
from human logic to intuition, from technical expertise
to previous experiences. After successful exploitation the
attacker usually has multiple ways to proceed depending
on the aim of the attack. It may simply keep an open
unauthorized channel to its target, it may extract private
or protected information, or it may use the target system to
carry on further attacks.
A relevant example of hacking that may be the con-
cern of PT is web hacking. The process of web hacking
can be decomposed in several successive and alternative
steps. Typically, the attacker starts by identifying a target
web service through a port scanning and by establishing a
communication with the service over the http protocol. She
can then access the website files inside the webroot folder,
download them, process them within a web browser, and
execute locally client-side scripts. Data can also be sent to
the remote files in order to be processed on the server-side
and obtain customized web responses. Server-side scripts
can do many complex actions, such as querying a database,
or reading and writing local files; the attacker may send
well-crafted inputs in order to compromise these operations.
Although web pages may present different and sometimes
unique vulnerabilities, typical vulnerabilities can identified
and classified [8].
2.1.2 Capture the flag hacking competitions
CTFs are practical learning platform for ethical hackers [9].
CTF events are normally organized as 48-hour competitions
during which different hacking challenges are provided to
the participants.
CTF competitions usually present a set of well-
formalized challenges. Each challenge is defined by one
vulnerability (or a chain of vulnerabilities) associated with a
flag. The aim of a participant is to exploit the vulnerability in
each challenge, and thus capture the associated flag. No fur-
ther steps are required from a player (such as, sending data
to a command and control server or maintaining the access);
the capture of a flag provides a unambiguous criterion to
decide whether a challenge was solved or not. Challenges
may be classified according to the type of problem they
present (e.g., web hacking challenge or binary exploitation).
Normally, human factors are excluded from the solution,
so that an attacker has to rely on her knowledge and
reasoning, but not on social engineering. In some instances,
information about the target system and the vulnerability
may be provided to the participants.
Standard CTFs run in Jeopardy mode, meaning that all
the participants are attackers, and they are presented with a
range of different static challenges. In other variants, partici-
pants may be subdivided in a red team, that is a team focused
on attacking a target system, and blue team, that is a team
tasked with defending the target system. Alternatively, each
team may be provided with an infrastructure they have to
protect while, at the same time, attacking the infrastructure
3of other teams. These last two variants of CTF defines non-
static, evolving vulnerabilities, as the defenders in the blue
team can change the services at run time by observing the
red team actions and patching their own vulnerabilities.
In sum, CTFs, especially in the Jeopardy mode, define a
set of well-defined problems that can capture the essence of
PT and that can be easily cast in the formalism of games.
2.2 Reinforcement Learning
The reinforcement learning (RL) paradigm offers a flexible
framework to model complex control problems and solve
them using general-purpose learning algorithms [3]. A RL
problem represents the problem of an agent trying to learn
an optimal behavior or policy within a given environment. The
agent is given minimal information about the environment,
its dynamics, and the nature or the effects of the actions
it can perform; instead, the agent is expected to learn a
sensible behavior by interacting with the environments,
thus discovering which actions in which states are more
rewarding, and finally defining a policy that allows it to
achieve its objectives in the best possible way.
2.2.1 Definition of a RL problem
Formally, a RL problem [3] is defined by a tuple or a
signature:
〈S,A, T ,R〉
where:
• S is the state set, that is the collection of all the states of
the given environment;
• A is the action set, that is the collection of all the actions
available to the agent;
• T : P (st+1|st, at) is the transition function of the envi-
ronment, that is the probability for the environment of
transitioning from state st to state st+1 were the agent
to take action at;
• R : P (rt|st, at) is the reward function, that is the
probability for the agent of receiving reward rt were
the agent to take action at in state st.
In this setup, it is assumed that the state of the environment
is perfectly known to the agent. This setup constitute a fully
observable Markov decision process (MDP) [3].
The behavior of the agent is encoded in a behavior
policy: pi (at|st) = P (at|st) , that is a probability distri-
bution over the available actions at given the state st of
the environment. We measure the quality of a policy as its
return, that is the sum of its expected rewards over a time
horizon T :
Gpit =
T∑
t=0
γtE [rt] ,
where γ < 1 is a discount factor that underestimate rewards
in the far future with respect to rewards in the near future.
The discount factor provides a formal solution to the prob-
lem of a potentially infinite sum, and an intuitive weighting
that makes our agent favor close-in-time rewards instead of
postponement. Given this notion of return, the aim of the
agent is to learn the optimal policy pi∗ that maximizes the
return G, that is the policy pi∗, not necessarily unique, such
that no other policy pi produces a higher return. Learning
an optimal policy requires the agent to balance between
the drive for exploration (finding previously unseen states
and actions that provide high reward) and for exploitation
(greedily choosing the states and actions that currently are
deemed to return the best rewards).
Interaction with the environment (and, therefore, learn-
ing) happens over steps and episodes. A step is an atomic
interaction of the agent with the environment: taking a
single action at according to the policy pi, collecting the
reward rt, and observing the environment evolving from
state st to state st+1. An episode is a collection of steps from
an initial state to an ending state.
Notice that during different episodes, even if the sig-
nature of the RL problem 〈S,A, T ,R〉 is unchanged, the
setup may be different. An RL agent is trained not to
solve just one specific instance of a problem, but an entire
set of problems with a similar structure described by the
formalism 〈S,A, T ,R〉. This variability among episodes is
important, and it allows a RL agent to generalize.
2.2.2 Algorithms for RL
Several algorithms have been proposed to solve the RL
problem. One of the simplest, yet well-performing, family
of RL algorithms is the family of action-value methods. These
algorithms tackle the problem of learning an optimal policy
pi∗ through a proxy function meant to estimate the value of
each pair of (state, action).
Formally, these methods define an action-value function
for a policy pi as:
qpi (st, at) = E [Gt|st, at] ,
that is, the action-value function for a pair (state, action)
is the expected return from state st after taking action
at according to policy pi. Generally, action-value methods
follow an approach to learning an optimal policy called
generalized policy iteration based on two steps:
1) given a starting policy pi0 interact with the environment
to learn an approximation of the function qpi0 (st, at);
2) improve the policy pi0 by defining a new policy pi1
where, in each state st, the agent takes the action at that
maximizes the action-value function qpi0 (st, a), that is
pi1 (at|st) =
{
1 if at = argmaxa qpi0 (st, a)
0 else
.
Iteratively repeating this process (and allowing space for
exploration), the agent will finally converge to the optimal
policy pi∗. While the second step is quite trivial, consisting
just of a maximizing operation, the first step requires fitting
the action-value function, and it may be more challenging
and time-consuming. There are two main ways of repre-
senting the action-value function:
• Tabular representation: this representation relies on a ma-
trix or a tensor Q to exactly encode each pair of (state,
action) and estimate its value; tabular representations
are simple, easy to examine, and statistically sound;
however they have limited generalization ability and
they do not scale well with the dimension of the state
space S and the action space A.
• Approximate representation: this representation relies on
fitting an approximate function qˆ; usual choices for qˆ
are parametric functions ranging from simple linear
4regression to complex deep neural networks; approx-
imate functions solve the problem of dealing with large
state space S and the action space A, and provide
generalization capabilities; however they are harder to
interpret and they often lack statistical guarantees of
convergence.
2.2.3 Q-Learning.
A standard action-value algorithm for solving the RL prob-
lem is Q-learning. Q-learning is a temporal-difference off-
policy RL algorithm; temporal-difference means that the algo-
rithm estimates the action-value function q (st, at) starting
from an initial guess (bootstrap), and updates step-by-step
its estimation with reference to the value of future states and
actions; off-policy means that Q-learning is able to learn an
optimal policy pi∗ while exploring the environment accord-
ing to another policy pib. Q-learning constitutes a versatile
algorithm that allows to tackle many RL problems; it can
be implemented both with a tabular representation Q of the
action-value function or with an approximate representation
qˆ (st, at).
Formally, given a RL problem 〈S,A, T ,R〉 with a dis-
count γ, an agent interacting with the environment in real-
time can gradually construct an approximation of the true
action-value function q (st, at) via a tabular representation
by gradually updating its estimation according to the for-
mula:
Q (st, at)← Q (st, at)+α
[
rt + γmax
x
Q (st+1, x)−Q (st, at)
]
,
(1)
where α ∈ R is a scalar defining a step-size [3]. Intuitively,
at every step the estimation of Q (st, at) moves towards the
true action-value function q (st, at) by a step α in a gradient
ascent-like way.
2.3 Related Work
Automated tools for PT consists mainly of security scanners
that can send predefined requests and analyze the answers
in order to detect specific vulnerabilities (e.g.: Nessus [10]).
These tools heavily rely on human intervention, in defin-
ing scripts, analyzing information and carrying out actual
exploitation. Some applications, such as sqlmap [11], may
perform exploitation too, although always with some degree
of user interaction.
Automating the whole process of developing PT strate-
gies has been the object of study for some times, and differ-
ent models have been proposed to tackle the problem, such
as attack graphs, Markov decision process, partially observable
Markov decision processes [12], Stackelberg games [13], or Petri
nets [14]. Many of the existing solutions follow a model-
based approach: a PT scenario is first encoded in one of
these well-defined models relying domain expertise, and
then processed using model checking or artificial intelli-
gence algorithms to produce optimal plans [2], [15], [16].
Recently, the use of RL algorithms has been proposed to
analyze these models [14], [17], too. However, one of the
main strengths of RL is its ability to tackle the learning
problem using a model-free approach: instead of relying on
a model carefully designed by an expert, a RL agent can
interact with an environment by itself and infer an optimal
strategy. This line of research has been studied in [18], with
the implementation of tabular and approximate Q-learning
algorithms to tackle a paradigmatic PT problem; our work
follows the same approach, although our study focuses on
a critical assessment of the use of RL across a wider set
of CTF problems, and on the evaluation of different RL
techniques aimed at addressing the specific problems we
have encountered.
It is also worth mentioning that the encounter between
PT and RL has been promoted by DARPA through the
Cyber Grand Challenge Event hosted in Las Vegas in 2016
[7]. This challenge was a CTF-like competition open to
automated agent. The organizers developed a special en-
vironment called DECREE (DARPA Experimental Cyber
Research Evaluation Environment) where the operating sys-
tem executed binary files in a modified format and only 7
system calls to limit the number of possible actions. Our
work takes inspiration from this challenge, and it aims at
studying RL agents that may be deployed to solve similar
simplified CTF problems.
3 MODELING PT AS A RL PROBLEM
In this section we discuss how we can model PT as a RL
problem by examining the challenges and the opportunities
in this task. We start by arguing that PT can be naively seen
as another game that can be solved by RL. We then move to
discuss specific issues in dealing with PT as a game: we first
focus on the issue of assessing the structure of a problem
in CTF challenges; then we review how the inferential
limitations of RL that may be particularly relevant when
dealing with PT. Bringing together these considerations, we
express what are the specific challenges in applying RL to
PT that we will experimentally examine in this paper.
3.1 PT as a Game
PT, especially when distilled as a CTFs, may be easily
expressed in terms of a game. It is immediate to identify
the players of the game (a red team and a blue team), the
rules of the game (the logic of the target system), and the
victory condition (capture of the flag). Given the success of
RL in tackling and solving games, it seems natural to try to
express PT as a game.
Furthermore, at first sight, the distinction between the
types of actions performed by an attacker(information gath-
ering and exploitation) seems to reflect the same division
between exploration actions and exploitation actions in RL.
Since RL is assumed to learn to balance exploration and ex-
ploitation, it may seem that the PT problem would perfectly
fit the RL paradigm.
However, casting the PT problem as a simple game
solvable by RL risks missing some challenges peculiar to PT.
The difficulty for an artificial agent to solve a CTF problem
is due not only to the sheer size of the problem domain, but
also to the limited structure of the PT problem and the limited
number of channels on which an agent can rely to learn.
3.2 Structure of a Learning Problem
A RL agent is able to solve a problem by exploiting some
structure underlying the problem itself. This structure is cap-
tured by an agent in the probability distribution of its policy;
5as it interacts with the environment, the agent updates its
policy and reconstructs the structure of the problem.
We then need to consider PT problems having some
form of structure. From the perspective of red team agent,
a target system may present different level of vulnerability
and structure. At one extreme, we have perfect systems, that is
systems where defense has no vulnerabilities; these systems
are of no interest here, since nothing but failure could be
learned either by a human or artificial attacker. Similarly
challenging are max-entropy systems, that is systems that
have a vulnerability but they have no structure allowing
an attacker to find this vulnerability. A max-entropy system
is a system where each action at or set of actions {at}t of
the attacker returns as a feedback information only whether
that action at or set of actions {at}t was successful or not;
no further inference about other actions may be drawn from
the feedback. In this setup, if we represent the starting
knowledge of the agent as a policy with a uniform distri-
bution over all actions or over all set of actions, then every
interaction will provide only a single bit of information,
that is the binary outcome of the chosen action or set of
actions; no information is provided for the agent to learn
about other possible courses of action and thus decrease the
entropy (uncertainty) of its policy. A max-entropy system
is not absolutely secure, but, provided that there must be a
vulnerability, is the safest possible static configuration for a
defender. Indeed, the only possible strategy of an attacker
against such a system is just to try out all the possible
actions. As such, we do not take into consideration this type
of problem as the policy or strategy to be learned is struc-
tureless and trivial1. We will instead focus on CTF systems,
that is systems that have a vulnerability and have enough
structure to allow an attacker to find such a weakness. This
setup is consistent with an actual CTF game, where the red
team players, by reasoning and following their intuitions,
can discover and exploit the vulnerability. By analogy, an
artificial agent is expected to exploit the structure of a
system to learn an optimal strategy.
3.3 Single Channel and Mode of Reasoning
A RL agent has some inherent limitations due to the nature
of the learning algorithms; the most concerning one with
respect to the problem of PT is the restricted number of
channels and mode of reasoning that can be used by an RL
agent.
A RL agent learns through a single channel, that is, by
sending requests to the target system and processing the
responses. It starts with no knowledge of the actions it
can take, nor with any internal model of the environment
Learning happens only by inference: from the rewards it
achieves by interacting with the environment, the agent will
infer the value of its actions in various states.
Standard RL makes minimal assumptions on prior
knowledge, and thus it defines a much more demanding
challenge than the learning challenge faced by a human
attacker in the real-world; indeed, a human player may
rely on several additional channels, modes of reasoning and
heuristics to restrict her space of options and direct her
1. This setup may be better suited to be formalized as a multi-armed
bandit problem [19].
action. For instance, she can collect information on the target
system from alternative sources on the Internet, rely on so-
cial engineering, make deductions about the target systems,
or produce and test hypothesis. All these alternatives are
normally precluded to any standard RL agent which has to
rely only on its ability to collect experience in a fast and
efficient way and perform induction over it.
3.4 Specific Challenges in Applying RL to PT
While RL has proved successful in solving many control
problems and in achieving super-human performances in
many games, the combination of the peculiar structure of
many PT problems and the limitations of RL give rise to
unique challenges when we try to apply RL to hacking.
The first big specific challenge follows from the limited
amount of structure of many hacking problems, up to the
limit of max-entropy systems described above. Ideally, a
system to be defended has little structure and it exchanges
with the potential attacker messages carrying as little infor-
mation as possible. In such a setting, the biggest challenge
for a red team RL agent is not to learn on optimal strategy
over a known structure (as in the case of a game), but
it is to discover the structure of the system itself. CTFs
stress the need for exploration: for an RL agent managing
an efficient exploration is as important as developing a
complex exploitation strategy. Good RL algorithms should
take this aspect in particular consideration.
The second hard challenge derives from the limited
amount of information and types of reasoning available to
the RL agent. Human red-team players rely on a wider set of
knowledge to solve a CTF challenge. This inevitably raises
the question of how efficiently trial-and-error alone can be
in addressing a CTF challenge. Conversely, this problem
invites to consider how RL algorithms can be enriched with
side information which would provide useful background
knowledge, thus directing and speeding the learning pro-
cess.
These two challenges will provide a criterion to study the
application of RL to PT and CTF, evaluate our simulations,
and suggest future developments.
4 RL MODEL OF A CTF PROBLEM
In this section we move on to propose a formalization of
CTF challenges using the formalism of RL. We first identify
the classes of CTF challenges that we will study experimen-
tally, and then present a precise formalization of these CTF
problems using the formalism of RL.
4.1 Types of CTF Problems
CTFs may be categorized in groups according to the type of
vulnerability they instantiate and the type of exploitation
that a player is expected to perform. Each class of CTF
problems may exhibit peculiar forms of structure and may
be modeled independently. In this paper, we will consider
the following prototypical classes of CTF problems:
• Port scanning and intrusion: in this CTF problem, a target
server system exposes on the network a set of ports,
and an attacker is required to check them, determine
6a vulnerable one, and obtain the flag between the
vulnerable port using a known exploit;
• Server hacking: in this CTF problem, a target server
system exposes on the network a set of services, and
an attacker is required to interact with them, discover a
vulnerability, either in the form of a simple unparame-
terized vulnerability or as a parametrized vulnerability,
and obtain the flag by exploiting the discovered vulner-
ability;
• Website hacking: a sub-type of a server hacking, in this
CTF problem, a target server system exposes on the
network a web site, and an attacker is required to check
the available pages, evaluate whether any contains a
vulnerability, and obtain the flag behind one of the
pages by exploiting the discovered vulnerability.
These three classes provide well-known tasks that can be
modeled as RL problem at various level of simplification
and abstraction.
4.2 RL Formalism
We consider as a RL agent an artificial red team hacking
player interacting with a vulnerable target system. The
target system constitutes the environment with which the
agent interact. The goal of the agent is to capture the flag in
the target environment in the fastest possible way. Given the
RL problem 〈S,A, T ,R〉 we set the following requirements
and conditions:
• The state space S is assumed to be an unstructured
finite set of states that encode the state of the envi-
ronment and, implicitly, the state of knowledge of the
agent.
• The action space A is assumed to be an unstructured
finite set containing all the possible actions that may
be performed by the agent. Notice that the set is the
same in any state; even if some action may not be
available to the agent in some states, this information
is not provided to the agent; an agent is expected to
learn by experience which action are possible in any
state.
• The transition function T is assumed to be a determin-
istic function that encodes the logic of the specific CTF
scenario that will be considered.
• The reward function R is assumed to be a deterministic
function defining how well the agent is performing.
Rewards will normally be dense but not highly infor-
mative: the agent receives a small negative reward for
each attempt performed (normally −1), and a large
positive reward for achieving its objective (normally
100); this setup will push the agent to learn the most
efficient strategy (in terms of attempts) to capture a flag.
In the following experimental analysis we will focus
on one particular algorithm, that is, tabular Q-learning. Our
choice is motivated by several factors: (i) in general, Q-
learning is a classical and well-performing algorithms, al-
lowing us to relate our results with the literature; (ii) it
guarantees that the agent will converge to an optimal policy;
(iii) the use of a tabular representation allows for a simpler
interpretation of the results; (iv) Q-learning is step-wise fast
and efficient, thus allowing us to easily repeat experiments
and guaranteeing reproducibility; (v) Q-learning has few
hyper-parameters, allowing for a more effective tuning. The
main drawback of adopting tabular Q-learning is scalability,
which, implicitly, reduces the complexity of the problems
that we will be able to consider. Despite this limitation,
though, our results will probe and validate the possibility
of solving CTF problems using RL, and they will allow us
to assess the relevance of the challenges we identified.
5 EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In this section we provide concrete instances of simple CTF
challenges, we model them in the form of RL problems
using the formalism discussed in Section 4, and we solve
them using Q-learning. We consider CTF challenges with
increasing complexity, and as we face the challenges we
identified in Section 3, we instantiate different methods
from the RL literature to tackle them. All the simulations
are implemented following the standard RL interface de-
fined in the OpenAI gym library2 [20], and they are made
available online 3 to guarantee reproducibility and further
experiments and extensions. Detailed explanations about
the action set and hyperparameter configuration of each
simulation are provided in the Supplemental Material.
5.1 Simulation 1: Port Scanning CTF Problem
In this simulation we consider a very simple port scanning
problem. We use the basic tabular Q-learning algorithm to
solve it, and we analyze our results in terms of structure of
the solution and inference steps to convergence.
CTF scenario. The target system is a server which runs
only one service affected by a known vulnerability. The port
number on which the service runs is unknown; however,
once the service port is discovered, the agent knows for
certain where the vulnerable service is and how to exploit it.
The red team agent can interact with the server by running a
port scan or by sending the known exploit to a specific port.
In this simplified scenario the vulnerability can be targeted
with a ready exploit with no parameters; also it is assumed
that no actions are performed by the blue team on the target
system.
RL Setup. We define a target server exposing N ports,
each one providing a different service; one of the services is
affected by a vulnerability, and behind it lies the objective
flag.
We model the action setA as a collection ofN+1 actions:
one port scan action, and one exploitation action for each
of the N existing ports. We also model the state set S as a
collection ofN+1 binary states: one initial state representing
the state of complete ignorance of the agent, and one state
for each port taking value of one when we discover it is
the vulnerable port. The dimensionality of a tabular action-
value matrix Q scales as O(N2).
This simple exercise allows us to have a basic assessment
of the learning ability of the agent. Notice that the agent is
not meant to learn simply the solution to a single instance
of this CTF game; in other words, it is not learning that the
flag will always be behind port k. In every instance of the
CTF game the flag is placed behind a different port; thus,
2. https://gym.openai.com/
3. https://github.com/FMZennaro/CTF-RL
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Fig. 1: Results of Simulation 1. (a) Learned action-value
matrix Q. (b) Plot of ratio
∑N
i=0Qii∑N
i,j=0Qij
as a function of the
number of episodes (in blue), and number of steps as a
function of the number of episodes (in purple).
the agent has to learn a generic strategy that allows it to solve
the problem independently from the initial setup.
In general terms, this problem constitutes a very simple
challenge, in which the optimal strategy is easily acknowl-
edged to be a two-step policy of scanning and then targeting
the vulnerable port with an exploit. However, the RL agent
is not aware of the semantics of the available actions and it
can not reason out an optimal strategy, but it can only learn
by trial and error.
Results. We run our simulation setting N = 64 ports.
We randomly initialized the policy of the agent and we run
1000 episodes. We repeat each simulation 100 times in order
to collect reliable statistics.
As discussed, in this simple scenario we know what
would be the optimal policy and, therefore, what we expect
the agent to learn. Figure 1(a) shows a plot of the action-
value matrix Q at the end of the 1000 episodes. The matrix
shows a clear diagonal pattern, meaning that in state si,
for 0 ≤ i ≤ N , the agent has learned to favor action ai.
This makes sense: in the initial complete-ignorance state s0
the agent selects action a0 corresponding to the port scan
action; in state si, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , corresponding to the
knowledge that port i is vulnerable, the agent selects action
ai, corresponding to an exploit on the relative port. We
can thus conclude that the agent has successfully learned
the desired optimal strategy. The blue plot in Figure 1(b)
shows the convergence towards the optimal strategy as a
function of the number of episodes. The y-axis reports the
ratio between the sum of the diagonal of Q, and the sum of
all the entries of Q, that is
∑N
i=0Qii∑N
i,j=0Qij
. Since we know that
the optimal strategy is encoded along the main diagonal
of Q, this statistics tells us how much of the mass of Q is
distributed along the diagonal. After around 400 episodes
the learning of the agent enters a phase of saturation. Notice
that this ratio would converge to 1 only in a infinite horizon.
The purple plot in Figure 1(b) illustrates the number of
steps per episode. After around 200 episodes the agent has
learned the optimal strategy and completes the challenges
in the minimum number of actions.
Discussion. The success of RL in this proof-of-concept
simulation is not surprising; yet, it highlights the specific
challenges of addressing hacking using RL: solving the CTF
challenge requires learning the structure of the problem; this
is feasible, but, using only experiential data and inference
means that the RL agent has to rely strongly on exploration.
Almost two hundred episodes were necessary to converge
to a solution, a number of attempts far greater than what
necessary for a human red team to find an optimal strategy.
5.2 Simulation 2: Non-stationary Port-scanning CTF
Problem
In this simulation we extend the previous problem by con-
sidering a more challenging scenario in which the target
system is not stationary, but it may randomly change in
response to the actions of the agent.
CTF scenario. In this scenario the blue team is not
passive anymore, but it can act in response to actions per-
petrated by the red team. We setup the same target system
as before: the server has a single exploitable service running
on a port whose number is unknown to the attacker. To
model an attack-defense scenario, we suppose that the blue
team is aware of the exploitable service but that they cannot
stop it because this would affect their continuous business
operation. The blue team cannot filter out traffic, and the
only option they have is to move the service to another port
if they observe actions that may prelude to an attack. This
case is rather unrealistic, but we use it as a simplified attack-
defence contest with limited actions.
RL Setup. We consider the same port scanning scenario
defined in the previous simulation. However, we add a non-
stationary dynamic: whenever the attacker uses a port scan
action, the target server detects it with probability p; if the
detection is successful the flag is randomly re-positioned
behind a new port. Given the non-stationarity, this problem
constitutes a more challenging learning problem than the
previous one. In particular, knowledge of the structure
gained by the agent via port scanning may not be reliable. In
this stochastic setting, the optimal strategy is not necessarily
the deterministic policy used in Simulation 1.
Results. We run our simulation settingN = 16 ports. All
the remaining parameters of this simulation are the same as
in Simulation 1. We consider all the possible values of p in
the set {0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9, 1.0}. We repeat each simulation
100 times in order to collect reliable statistics.
Figure 2 reports the action-value matrices learned for
p = 0.1, p = 0.5 and p = 1. While for small value of
p the action-value matrix Q resembles closely the pattern
we observed in Simulation 1, for higher values of p we
lose this structure. In the almost-deterministic case p = 0.1
(Figure 2(a)) it is reasonable to use a port scan action at
the beginning, followed by an exploit action that has a
high probability of success; therefore we observe the usual
diagonal shape. In the more stochastic case p = 0.5 (Figure
2(b)) it is likely that a port scan action is detected and that
the flag is moved; yet using a port scanning action and a
targeted action is still a reasonable bet, even if less effective
(notice the different scale for the matrices in Figure 2(a)
and Figure 2(b)). Finally in the completely random case
p = 1 (Figure 2(c)) a port scan action certainly results in
a detection, and no plan can be built over the information
gathered; the agent is basically reduced to resort to plain
random guessing. Consistently, Figure 3 shows the number
of steps per episode when using p = 0.1, p = 0.5, p = 1.
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Fig. 2: Results of Simulation 2. Learned action-value matrix
Q for: (a) p = 0.1, (b) p = 0.5, and (c) p = 1.
Fig. 3: Results of Simulation 2. Number of steps as a function
of episodes for p = 0.1, p = 0.5, p = 1.
In the almost-deterministic case, the number of episodes
sets almost immediately close to optimal; as we increase the
stochasticity the number of steps increases because the agent
can only try to guess the location of the vulnerability. Notice
that the average number of steps in the completely random
setting is higher than the number of ports; this is due to
the fact that the agent tries out from time to time the port
scan action, thus causing the flag to move, and requiring the
agent to re-try its exploit on already checked ports.
Discussion. A non-stationary and non-monotonic prob-
lem constitutes, as it is well-known, a more challenging
learning problem. Despite this, thanks to its formalization, a
Q-learning agent is still able to solve this CTF problem in a
reasonable, yet sub-optimal, way, as allowed by the degree
of stochasticity and non-stationarity. Shifting the value of
p shows the dependence of the performance of the RL
algorithm on its ability to discover a structure underlying
the problem. For p = 0, the CTF system has a clear structure
and it can learn an optimal policy; as p increases, we slowly
move from what we defined as a CTF system to a max-
entropy system (see Section 3). Indeed, for p = 1 our problem
represents a max-entropy system: no action provides actual
information on the structure of the target server (the port
scan action is essentially unreliable and useless); unable to
reconstruct any structure, RL has a very limited use: all we
can do is just guessing, that is trying out one by one all the
ports looking for the vulnerability. This underlies the role of
structure in learning using RL agents.
5.3 Simulation 3: Server Hacking CTF Problem with
Lazy Loading
In this simulation we consider a more realistic problem
representing a simple server hacking scenario. To manage
the large dimensionality of the state and action space and
prune non-relevant state we adopt a lazy loading approach
for our action-value table Q (st, at). We analyze how learn-
ing happens under this scenario, and what is the effect of
the adopted approach on inference.
CTF scenario. In this simulation a target server provides
different standard services, such as web, ftp, or ssh. Each
service may have a vulnerability, either a simple vulner-
ability easily exploitable without a parameter (such as a
Wordpress page with a plugin that may lead to an informa-
tion disclosure in a specific known url) or a vulnerability
requiring the attacker to send a special input (such as a
Wordpress plugin with sql injection).
The attacker can carry out three types of information
gathering actions. (i) It can check for open ports and services
on the server. (ii) It can try to interact with the services
using well-known protocols; this allows it to obtain basic
information (such as banner information), and discover
known vulnerabilities, such as weaknesses recorded in a
vulnerability databases. (iii) It can interact more closely
with potentially unique service setups or customized web
pages; this will allow the attacker to identify undocumented
vulnerabilities and the input parameters necessary for ex-
ploitation; for instance, in case of a ftp service, the agent may
discover the input parameters for username and password,
or, in the case of more complex services such as web, it
may obtain get and post web parameters. In addition, the
attacker has also two exploitation actions. (i) It can exploit a
non-parametrized vulnerability by accessing the vulnerable
service and retrieving the flag. (ii) It can choose a parameter
out of a finite pre-defined set, and send it to a service to
exploit a parametrized vulnerability and obtain the flag. In
this scenario we make the simplified assumption that the
agent can identify just a parameter name from a fixed and
limited set, and it does not need to select a parameter value.
RL Setup. We define a target server exposing N ports,
each providing one of V different services. One of the
services is taken to be flawed, and behind it lies the objective
flag. The vulnerability may be a simple non-parametrized vul-
nerability or a parametrized vulnerability. In the last case, the
vulnerability may be already known, or it may be previously
unknown thus requiring deeper probing and analysis of the
service. The parameter for the parametrized vulnerability is
chosen out of a set of M possible parameters.
The collection of basic actions available to the agent
gives rise to a larger set A of concrete actions, where each
action type is instantiated against a specific port. The set
of states S has a large dimensionality as well, due to the
problem of tracking what the agent has learned during its
interaction with the server. As a rough estimation, in our
implementation we estimate the number of total states as:
|S| ≈ 211N3VM. (2)
Refer to the Supplemental Material for the derivation of this
approximation. This encoding forms a sufficient statistics
that tracks all the actions of the agent and records all its
knowledge. It is not meant to be an optimal encoding, and
the dimensionality of the set S may be reduced through
a smarter representation of the states. However, even if
we were to make the encoding more efficient, the overall
dimensionality would quickly become unmanageable when
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Fig. 4: Results of Simulation 3. (a) Plot of number of steps as
a function of the number of episodes; (b) plot of reward as
a function of the number of episodes.
the parameters N , M or V were to grow. Instead of relying
on expert knowledge of the specific problem at hand, we
rely on the assumption that several (state, action) pairs
that may not be relevant or informative. This leads us to
adopt a lazy-loading technique: instead of instantiating from
the start a large unmanageable action-value matrix Q, we
progressively build up the data structure of Q as the agent
experiences new (state, action) pairs.
This problem constitutes a more realistic model of a
CTF challenge, presenting a target system with multiple
services, each one potentially having different type of weak-
ness (unparameterized and parametrized vulnerabilities) at
different levels (easy vulnerabilities already known or more
treacherous vulnerabilities yet unknown). In this more chal-
lenging problem it is harder to define a simple deterministic
optimal solution as it was in Simulation 1. A standard
approach is undoubtedly to use more exploratory actions
at the beginning, and leave exploitative actions for the end.
However, the variability in the location of the flag and the
sharp dynamics of the system make the problem far from
trivial.
Results. We run our simulation setting N = 4 ports,
V = 5 services, M = 4 parameters. We randomly initialize
pairs of (state, action) at run-time, and we run the agent for
106 episodes. We repeat each simulation 20 times in order
to collect reliable statistics in a feasible amount of time.
Figure 4(a) reports the number of steps taken by our
agent to complete a task, and, conversely 4(b) shows the
reward obtained by the agent. These plots are quite noisy,
but they show a clear improvement in the first few thousand
episodes: we can clearly see a drop in the number of steps
and an increase in the amount of reward collected. Notice
that the high variance recorded is in part due to the highly
exploratory behavior of the agent ( = 0.3) that leads the
agent to take a random action almost one third of the times.
Interestingly, though, the upper bound of the reward curve
approaches a reward of 80 or higher, pointing out that the
agent was indeed able to learn a sensible strategy as it was
able to solve the CTF problem in few actions compared
to the large number of possible combinations of actions
it could try. Figure 5 shows the number of entry in the
action-value table Q during the episodes. The plot seems
to have a parabolic behavior growing fast at the beginning
and slowing down towards the end. This makes sense, as at
the beginning every state encountered by the agent is new
and needs to be added to the table Q. The continual increase
Fig. 5: Results of Simulation 3. Number of entries in the
action-value table Q as a function of number of episodes.
in size is due to the strong exploratory policy ( = 0.3)
followed by the agent. Notice, that if we were to substitute
the values of N , V and M of this simulation in Equation
2 we would get a rough estimate for |S| of over 2 · 106;
therefore the number of states learned so far is an order of
magnitude smaller (3.5·105), and it has allowed the agent to
learn swiftly a reasonable policy with a significantly smaller
consumption of memory.
Discussion. This more realistic simulations highlights at
the same time the standard strengths and weaknesses of RL
agents. An RL agent may be able to tackle a challenging
problem with a subtle and sharp structure like the one
presented, but, potentially, at a high computational cost.
A trivial implementation may still be able to solve the
problem, but it may quickly become unmanageable if it were
to treat explicitly all the possible states. Instead of relying on
expert knowledge to determine which states are important
and which not, lazy loading has allowed the agent to dis-
criminate between relevant and non-relevant states based
on its experience. In the following simulations we evaluate
alternative ways to improve the learning process of the
agent.
5.4 Simulation 4: Website Hacking CTF Problem with
State Aggregation
In this simulation we run an environment similar to the
previous one, and we adopt an additional strategy to ad-
dress the challenge of exploration by instructing the agent
to perform state aggregation over similar states. Again, we
run our simulations and we study the dynamics and the
performance of inference and learning.
CTF scenario. In this simulation we assume that the
attacker knows the location of a target web page, so no
port scan or protocol identification is required. The webpage
consists of a set of files: starting from an index file, the
attacker can map the visible files by reading the html content
and by following the links inside the content. The webpage
may also host hidden files not linked to the index. Some
of the files contain server-side scripts and the attacker may
identify customized inputs that may be sent to perform an
exploitation and capture the flag. The attacker is given three
types of information gathering actions. (i) It can read the
index file, follow recursively all links, and thus obtain a
map of all the linked files on the server. (ii) It can try to
find hidden files by parsing the content of a visible file and
infer the existence of hidden files; for instance, looking at
a file on a Wordpress site, the attacker may suspect the
existence of /wp-login/index.php. (iii) It can analyze a visible
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Fig. 6: Results of Simulation 4. (a) Number of entries in
the action-value matrix Q as a function of the number of
episodes; (b) reward and number of steps as a function of
the number of episodes.
or hidden file in order to find input parameters that can
be used for an exploitation. A single exploitation action is
possible. (i) The attacker can send an input parameter to a
file and, if correctly targeting the vulnerable file, obtain the
flag. Here, again we restrict our model to the problem of
identifying a vulnerable parameter name out of a set, and
not its parameter value.
RL Setup. We define a target server hosting N files,
partitioned inNvis visible files andNhid hidden files. Visible
files are linked to the index file and connected among
them in a complete graph; hidden files are files not openly
linked to the index files but referenced or related to one of
the visible files. One of the files, either visible or hidden,
contains a parametrized vulnerability behind which lies a
flag. The vulnerable parameter is chosen out of a set of M
possible parameters.
As before, the dimensionality of the action-value matrix
grows exponentially with the number of files N and the
number of parameters M . In order to make the problem
manageable we decided to introduce prior knowledge in
our model. We know that files on the target servers may be
different, but the way to interact with them is uniform: we
explore and inspect files using the same actions; we target
files with the same vulnerability in an identical way. Notice
that, in the real-world, the concrete way in which we im-
plement actions on different files may be different, but these
distinctions are abstracted away in the current model. The
dynamics of interacting with files are then homogeneous
among all the files. Thus, instead of requiring the agent to
learn a specific strategy on each file, we instruct it to learn
a single policy that will be used on all the files. We achieve
this simplification using state aggregation [3]. At each time
step, the agent will be focused only on a single file, interact
with it and update a global policy valid for any file.
Results. We run our simulations randomly setting 2 ≤
Nvis ≤ 4 visible files and 0 ≤ Nhid ≤ 2 hidden files.
We randomly initialize pairs of (state, action) using lazy
loading and state aggregation. We run a single agent for
105 episodes and then we test it on 100 episodes during
which we set the exploration parameter  to 0. We repeat
the testing of a trained agent 100 times in order to collect
reliable statistics.
Figure 6(a) shows the number of (state, action) pairs
in the action-value table Q of our agent during the 105
episodes of learning. The number of states saturates very
quickly, enumerating all the∼ 180 states encountered by the
agent. Figure 6(b) shows the reward and the number of steps
on further 100 episodes when running the same agent with
the exploration parameter () set to zero. As expected the
two plots are perfectly complementary, with the number of
steps oscillating between 8 and 10, and the reward between
91 and 93. Removing the exploration parameter is a risky
choice that may lead the agent to get stuck if it were to
face sudden changes in the environment, but it allows us to
better appreciate the fact that the agent indeed was able to
learn a clear policy that allowed it to capture a flag with a
minimal number of actions; eight to ten steps is indeed what
is necessary to probe the target server, collect information on
the files, and finally retrieve the flag.
Discussion. This simulation preserves most of the com-
plexity of Simulation 3, and it shows how using proper
RL algorithms and techniques (lazy loading and state ag-
gregation), a RL agent may manage to solve a challenging
CTF problem. Notice that state aggregation allowed us to
introduce a form of knowledge that a RL agent would not
normally have. A human red team player may reach the
conclusion that it is reasonable to act in a uniform way with
different files from her previous experience with files; this
knowledge provides her with an effective shortcut to reach
a solution. A RL agent has no similar possibility as it has no
formal concept of files; it could end up learning by inference
a policy that is actually uniform for all the files, but this
would require collecting a large sample of experiences. State
aggregation allowed to inject useful prior information about
the structure of the problem, thus simplifying exploration
and reducing the number of (state, action) pairs.
Another interesting feature of this simulation is the use
of a graph to represent the filesystem on the target web-
site. In this simulation, given the small size of the graph
comprising between two and six files we relied on a simple
linear exploration of the graph; however, smarter and more
sophisticated way of manipulating and exploring the graph
may be taken into consideration to improve the performance
of the agent. This may be a further development of interest,
but in the next simulation we will consider a different
modification and rely again on an alternative state-of-the-
art approach to the problem to direct the learning of the RL
agent.
5.5 Simulation 5: Web Hacking CTF Problem with Imi-
tation Learning
In this simulation we consider a way to direct the learning
process more explicitly by using imitation learning, in which
we simulate learning in a teacher-and-student setting. We
analyze the behavior of the agent under this setup and we
compare the results of this process with the results obtained
in the previous simulations.
Hacking scenario. We consider again the same server
hacking problem presented in Simulation 3, as this consti-
tutes the most challenging problem we have faced so far.
RL Setup. We consider the same setup used in Simula-
tion 3. Beyond lazy-loading, this time we also rely on an-
other standard RL technique, that is, imitation learning (or
learning from demonstrations) [21]. In imitation learning,
an agent is provided with a set of D trajectories defined
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Fig. 7: Results of Simulation 5. Reward achieved by RL
agents with and without imitation learning (see text for
explanation).
by human experts; in our case, these trajectories encode the
behavior of a hypothetical human red team player trying
to solve the web hacking CTF problem. These trajectories
represent samples of successful behavior and provide in-
formation to the RL agent about the relevance of different
options. Indeed, in imitation learning, the agent, instead of
starting in a state of complete ignorance, is offered examples
of how actions can be combined to reach a solution of the
problem. This simplifies the exploration problem: instead of
searching uniformly in the whole space policies, the search
is biased towards expert-defined policies. This bias allows
to solve the problem more efficiently, but it also makes
less likely that the agent will discover policies that are
substantially different from human behavior.
Results. We run our simulations using the same setting
used in Simulation 3. First, we train a standard RL agent
for 105 episodes. Then, we train three imitation learning
agent, each one being provided with 100, 200 and 500
demonstration respectively; after that the three imitation
learning agent are further trained for 100 episodes.
Figure 7 shows the rewards obtained by the differ-
ent agents. The dotted lines represent the average reward
obtained by the imitation learning agent during the 100
episodes of training; notice that these lines are independent
from the scale on the x-axis and are plotted as constants for
reference. The blue line shows the reward, averaged every
100 episodes, obtained by the standard RL agent during
training. The graph shows that the standard RL agent need
to be trained on almost 2000 episodes before reaching the
average reward that an imitation learning agent can achieve
with 100 demonstrations; similarly, the whole training time
of 105 episodes is necessary to match an imitation learning
agent provided with 500 demonstrations. The overall re-
wards are still far from being optimal, but imitation learning
allows for a reduction of the number of episodes of training
of one order of magnitude.
Discussion. Imitation learning proved to be an effective
techniques to enable faster learning for the RL agent. This
improvement is again due to the possibility of introducing
in the agent knowledge on the structure of the problem. In-
deed, demonstrations are an implicit way to express human
knowledge about the structure of the CTF problem: instead
of encoding knowledge on the structure of the problem in
a formal mathematical way, we provide the RL agent with
concrete observations about the structure of the problem.
This information can successfully be exploited by the agent
in order to learn an optimal policy.
6 DISCUSSION
The simulations in this paper showed the feasibility of using
RL for solving CTF problems, as well as the central role
that the challenges of discovering structure and providing
prior knowledge play in this context. While RL was able to
solve optimally a simple CTF with an elementary structure
(Simulation 1), we observed that changes in the structure of
the CTF problem may make the problem harder to solve.
We considered two ways in which the structure of the
problem may change and raise concrete challenges. First,
a progressively more undefined problem structure, shifting
from a stationary CTF system to a max-entropy system,
highlighted the limits of learning by inference (Simulation
2). Second, a stationary CTF problem with a progressively
more complex structure required an exponential number of
samples for the agent to work out the structure of the prob-
lem. In this last case, we showed how RL techniques, such
as lazy loading, state aggregation, or imitation learning,
may allow the RL agent to tackle more complex problems
(Simulation 3, 4, 5). These techniques were explained and
justified in terms of providing the agent with elementary
prior information about the structure of the problem. Lazy
loading corresponded to the assumption that certain config-
uration in the problem space would never be experienced,
and therefore could be ignored; state aggregation expressed
the assumption that certain configuration would be prag-
matically identical to others; and imitation learning codified
the assumptions that an optimal solution would not be
too far from well-known demonstrations. Notice that while
imitation learning necessarily require expert knowledge,
lazy loading and state aggregation are based on simple as-
sumption needing limited expertise. Although implemented
in specific simulations, all these forms of prior knowledge
are not semantically-tied to a specific problem, and they
may be easily deployed across a wide range of other CTF
problems. Devising way to efficiently discover the structure
of a CTF problem pure inference is then crucial to develop
agents that can effectively perform PT.
7 FUTURE WORK
Several of the scenarios that we considered in this paper
were very simplified versions of CTFs, more similar to toy
problems than real challenges. Progressing forward would
mean, at the same time, scaling the complexity of CTFs and
improving the way in which a RL agent manages structure
and prior knowledge.
In terms of scaling structure, a direct way to achieve this
would be to increase the sheer complexity of the problems
by expanding the size of state and action space in order to
resemble more closely what we see in reality. Complexity
may also be increased by consistently adopting the assump-
tion of non-stationarity, as we briefly did in Simulation 2.
Alternatively, we may require that the interaction between
the RL agent and the target system does not use custom-
made machine-interpretable messages, but real-world pro-
tocol messages that may be processed by a dedicated lan-
guage processing module.
In terms of learning the structure of the problem and
integrate prior knowledge, better generalization (and scala-
bility) can be achieved by switching from tabular algorithms
12
to approximate algorithms, thus sacrificing interpretability.
More interestingly, it is possible to consider the possibility
of learning through multiple channels or relying on other
forms of prior knowledge; promising directions would be the
integration of planning [4], hierarchical decomposition of a
CTF in sub-tasks, reliance on relational inductive biases, [22]
or integration of logical knowledge in the learning process [23].
Tangentially, other challenges include the use of model
learning, in order to allow the agent to learn an approximate
model of the transition function of the environment, so that
it could learn off-line via simulation; and proper reward
shaping, that is, providing rewards that may better guide
the learning process. Finally, real-world agents may have to
consider the problem of transfer learning [24], that is how to
port the knowledge obtained from a class of CTF problems
to another set of CTF problems.
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this work we considered CTF competitions as concrete
instances of PT, and we modeled them as RL problems.
We highlighted that two crucial challenges for a RL agent
confronting a CTF problem are: (i) the challenge of discov-
ering a structure that is often limited and protected; (ii) the
challenge of learning using only inference, whereas human
players may rely on many other forms of knowledge and
reasoning. We ran a varied set of simulations, implementing
tabular Q-learning agents solving diverse CTF problems.
Our results confirmed the relevance of the challenges we
identified, and we showed how different RL techniques
(lazy loading, state aggregation, imitation learning) may be
adopted to address these challenges and make RL feasible.
We observed that while a strength of RL is its ability to
solve model-free problems with minimal prior information,
some form of side information may be extremely useful for
allowing the solution of a CTF in a reasonable time. We
believe a constructive approach would be for RL to learn
from standard artificial intelligence model-based methods
and balance RL model-free inference with model-based
deductions and inductive biases.
Our implementations are open and use standard inter-
faces adopted in the RL research community. It is our hope
that this would make an exchange between the fields easier,
with researchers in security able to borrow state-of-the-art
RL agents to solve their problems, and RL researchers given
the possibility of developing new insights by tackling the
specific challenges instantiated in CTF games.
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